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   1	  
In	  Defense	  of	  the	  Ivory	  Tower:	  Why	  Philosophers	  Should	  Stay	  Out	  of	  Politics	  
Bas	  van	  der	  Vossen	  
Philosophy,	  UNC	  Greensboro	  
b_vande2@uncg.edu	  
(Forthcoming	  in	  Philosophical	  Psychology)	  
	  
Karl	  Marx	  wrote	  that	  the	  point	  of	  philosophy	  is	  not	  to	  interpret	  the	  world	  but	  to	  change	  it.	  
(Marx	  1975,	  Thesis	  11)	  Plato	  thought	  that	  philosophers	  should	  be	  in	  charge	  of	  governing	  
society.	  (Plato	  2004,	  book	  VI)	  Marx	  and	  Plato	  expressed	  an	  ideal	  of	  the	  philosopher	  as	  a	  
politically	  engaged	  person.	  Philosophers	  should	  be	  directly	  involved	  in	  solving	  social	  problems,	  
implementing	  their	  theories	  through	  political	  activism.	  In	  similar	  spirit	  many	  now	  complain	  that	  
university	  campuses	  resemble	  an	  Ivory	  Tower.	  Universities,	  they	  lament,	  have	  become	  
academic	  in	  the	  pejorative	  sense	  –	  removed	  from	  society,	  focused	  on	  esoteric	  questions.	  The	  
ideal	  university	  is	  bustling	  with	  social	  and	  political	  activity.	  The	  ideal	  academic	  is	  socially	  
concerned	  and	  politically	  engaged.1	  
	   I	  believe	  this	  picture	  gets	  things	  exactly	  wrong.	  As	  I	  will	  argue,	  it	  is	  morally	  wrong	  for	  
certain	  academics	  to	  be	  politically	  active	  or	  engaged.	  In	  fact,	  it	  is	  wrong	  for	  precisely	  those	  
academics	  that	  work	  on	  politically	  relevant	  topics,	  most	  prominently	  among	  them	  political	  
philosophers.	  For	  them,	  the	  university	  should	  become	  more	  like	  an	  Ivory	  Tower,	  not	  less.	  
	   I	  am	  interested	  here	  in	  showing	  the	  problems	  with	  political	  activism	  or	  engagement	  
understood	  in	  a	  relatively	  common-­‐sense	  way.	  There	  are	  interesting	  and	  complicated	  questions	  
about	  what	  exactly	  counts	  as	  political	  activism,	  but	  I	  will	  not	  consider	  these	  here.	  (Fraser	  2008)2	  
My	  aim	  is	  to	  convince	  you	  that	  there	  are	  real	  problems	  with	  a	  number	  of	  standard	  political	  
activities	  in	  which	  many	  academics	  do,	  and	  think	  they	  ought	  to,	  engage.	  Thus,	  when	  speaking	  of	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political	  activism,	  I	  will	  have	  in	  mind	  things	  like	  being	  a	  member	  of	  a	  political	  party,	  
campaigning	  during	  elections,	  making	  political	  donations,	  volunteering	  in	  advocacy	  groups,	  
political	  community	  organizing,	  putting	  up	  yard	  signs,	  bumper	  stickers,	  promoting	  a	  political	  
party	  at	  dinner	  parties,	  generally	  rooting	  for	  one	  side	  or	  another,	  and	  so	  on.	  As	  will	  become	  
clear,	  the	  problem	  with	  these	  activities	  is	  that	  they	  encourage	  us	  to	  think	  about	  ourselves	  in	  
partisan	  terms.	  And	  this	  is	  incompatible	  with	  our	  academic	  professional	  responsibilities.	  
	   Most	  of	  the	  discussion	  below	  will	  mention	  academic	  political	  philosophers.	  In	  part	  this	  is	  
for	  a	  reason	  unrelated	  to	  the	  argument.	  I	  am	  a	  professional	  political	  philosopher	  myself,	  and	  it	  
helps	  to	  formulate	  one’s	  critical	  arguments	  in	  ways	  that	  relate	  to	  one’s	  own	  life.	  But	  I	  also	  focus	  
on	  academic	  political	  philosophers	  because	  they	  represent	  the	  archetype	  of	  the	  case	  with	  
which	  I	  am	  concerned:	  those	  who	  are	  serious	  about	  thinking	  through	  political	  issues.	  That	  being	  
said,	  my	  conclusions	  are	  not	  limited	  to	  political	  philosophers	  alone.	  Those	  who	  do	  no	  get	  paid	  
to	  think	  about	  politics,	  and	  those	  who	  are	  engaged	  in	  other	  disciplines	  (sociology,	  political	  
science,	  economics,	  gender	  studies,	  psychology,	  and	  so	  on)	  are	  subject	  to	  the	  same	  ethical	  
demands.	  
	   My	  argument	  relies	  on	  three	  simple	  claims.	  Each	  of	  these	  is	  defended	  in	  a	  separate	  
section.	  Section	  4	  discusses	  some	  potential	  objections.	  
	  
(1)	  The	  importance	  of	  doing	  a	  good	  job	  
The	  first	  claim	  of	  this	  argument	  concerns	  what	  we	  might	  call	  professional	  morality,	  or	  the	  
ethical	  demands	  of	  taking	  up	  a	  certain	  role	  or	  profession.	  Consider	  the	  following	  two	  examples:	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Sam	  is	  a	  surgeon	  who	  is	  scheduled	  to	  perform	  major	  surgery	  on	  a	  patient	  early	  
tomorrow	  morning.	  Sam	  knows	  this.	  Sam	  also	  knows	  that	  he	  knows	  he	  generally	  
performs	  better	  after	  a	  good	  night’s	  sleep.	  Yet	  Sam	  goes	  out	  drinking	  with	  his	  friends	  
the	  night	  before.	  Sam	  turns	  up	  for	  work	  on	  a	  few	  hours’	  sleep,	  hung	  over,	  to	  perform	  
the	  surgery.	  
Claire	  works	  as	  a	  chemist	  in	  a	  laboratory.	  Her	  experiments	  need	  to	  run	  for	  eight	  straight	  
hours	  and	  require	  her	  to	  be	  present	  to	  record	  results	  every	  three	  minutes.	  This	  means	  
she	  cannot	  leave	  to	  have	  lunch.	  Claire	  knows	  that	  her	  laboratory	  should	  remain	  as	  free	  
from	  pollutants	  as	  it	  can	  be.	  Yet,	  around	  lunchtime,	  Claire	  decides	  to	  eat	  a	  sandwich	  at	  
her	  workplace.	  While	  eating,	  she	  continues	  to	  monitor	  the	  experiment.	  
What	  should	  we	  say	  about	  these	  cases?	  One	  thing	  that	  is	  clear	  is	  that	  we	  should	  disapprove	  of	  
the	  way	  in	  which	  Claire	  and	  (especially)	  Sam	  are	  behaving.	  Both	  are	  taking	  serious	  and	  
unnecessary	  risks.	  Sam	  may	  very	  well	  end	  up	  seriously	  harming	  his	  patient.	  Claire	  may	  mess	  up	  
her	  carefully	  constructed	  and	  expensive	  experiments,	  producing	  faulty	  results.	  And	  both	  could	  
have	  easily	  avoided	  doing	  so.	  A	  morally	  responsible	  person,	  someone	  who	  takes	  his	  or	  her	  
professional	  responsibilities	  seriously,	  would	  not	  do	  these	  things.	  
	   However,	  to	  explain	  why	  their	  actions	  are	  wrong,	  we	  cannot	  just	  refer	  to	  the	  nature	  of	  
Sam	  and	  Claire’s	  actions	  as	  such.	  After	  all,	  Sam	  and	  Claire	  are	  hardly	  doing	  things	  that	  are	  
morally	  wrong	  in	  and	  of	  themselves.	  Generally	  speaking,	  it	  is	  perfectly	  permissible	  to	  go	  out	  for	  
drinks	  with	  one’s	  friends	  or	  eat	  a	  sandwich	  at	  one’s	  workplace.	  Moreover,	  the	  wrongness	  of	  
their	  actions	  also	  is	  not	  adequately	  explained	  by	  referring	  to	  the	  harm	  they	  cause.	  After	  all,	  Sam	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might	  end	  up	  performing	  well	  despite	  his	  hangover,	  and	  Claire	  might	  succeed	  in	  catching	  all	  the	  
crumbs.	  
	   What	  makes	  Sam	  and	  Claire’s	  behavior	  wrong,	  then,	  are	  the	  circumstances	  imposed	  by	  
their	  respective	  professions.	  Both	  have	  a	  responsibility,	  and	  a	  moral	  one	  at	  that,	  to	  perform	  
their	  professional	  tasks	  well.	  Sam	  and	  Claire	  are	  not	  living	  up	  to	  this	  responsibility.	  This	  suggests	  
a	  moral	  principle	  associated	  with	  our	  professional	  responsibilities.	  I	  will	  call	  it	  the	  principle	  of	  
responsible	  professionalism	  (RP).	  We	  can	  state	  it	  as	  follows:	  
RP:	  People	  who	  take	  up	  a	  certain	  role	  or	  profession	  thereby	  acquire	  a	  prima	  facie	  moral	  
duty	  to	  make	  a	  reasonable	  effort	  to	  avoid	  things	  that	  predictably	  make	  them	  worse	  at	  
their	  tasks.3	  
RP	  is	  a	  precautionary	  principle.	  It	  requires	  that	  those	  who	  take	  up	  a	  certain	  role	  or	  profession,	  
like	  that	  of	  a	  surgeon	  or	  chemist,	  take	  reasonable	  steps	  that	  protect	  them	  against	  doing	  a	  bad	  
job.	  Sam	  should	  take	  reasonable	  measures	  to	  make	  sure	  he	  does	  not	  mess	  up	  his	  surgery,	  and	  
he	  fails	  to	  do	  so	  by	  going	  out	  drinking.	  Claire	  should	  take	  reasonable	  measures	  to	  make	  sure	  she	  
does	  not	  mess	  up	  her	  experiments,	  and	  she	  fails	  to	  do	  so	  by	  eating	  a	  sandwich	  in	  what	  should	  
be	  a	  clean	  test	  environment.4	  
	   This	  principle	  RP	  needs	  to	  be	  qualified	  in	  certain	  ways.	  For	  example,	  it	  seems	  plausible	  
that	  RP	  applies	  only	  to	  those	  roles	  and	  professions	  that	  are	  morally	  acceptable.	  It	  makes	  no	  
sense	  to	  say	  that	  the	  hitman	  has	  a	  moral	  duty	  to	  be	  good	  at	  killing	  people.	  But	  this	  will	  not	  
affect	  our	  discussion	  since	  we	  can	  take	  it	  for	  granted	  that	  the	  profession	  of	  a	  political	  
philosopher	  is	  morally	  acceptable.	  Another	  possible	  qualification	  may	  be	  that	  RP	  applies	  only	  to	  
certain	  professions,	  and	  not	  to	  all	  (“mere”)	  jobs.	  Perhaps	  people	  do	  not	  have	  an	  obligation	  to	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take	  the	  reasonable	  precautions	  for	  avoiding	  being	  bad	  at	  flipping	  burgers,	  cleaning	  the	  floors,	  
or	  issuing	  driver’s	  licenses.	  Perhaps	  RP	  applies	  only	  to	  those	  professions	  that	  have	  a	  kind	  of	  
public	  dimension	  –	  like	  medicine,	  research,	  public	  office,	  or	  teaching.	  I	  do	  not	  think	  this	  is	  
plausible,	  but	  will	  accept	  it	  here	  as	  it	  does	  not	  affect	  my	  argument	  about	  the	  profession	  
occupied	  by	  political	  thinkers.5	  
	   One	  thing	  to	  keep	  in	  mind	  about	  RP	  is	  that	  it	  only	  requires	  that	  we	  avoid	  those	  things	  
that	  predictably	  make	  us	  worse	  at	  performing	  our	  tasks.	  In	  this	  sense	  RP	  is	  modest.	  It	  requires	  
only	  that	  we	  take	  certain	  precautions.	  This	  is	  the	  point	  about	  Sam	  and	  Claire.	  As	  a	  precaution,	  
Sam	  should	  have	  gone	  to	  bed	  on	  time	  and	  sober.	  And	  as	  a	  precaution,	  Claire	  should	  arrange	  for	  
some	  other	  way	  to	  eat	  her	  lunch	  so	  as	  to	  avoid	  needlessly	  polluting	  her	  experiment.	  
	   RP	  therefore	  does	  not	  require	  that	  we	  be	  perfect	  at	  our	  tasks.	  It	  does	  not	  even	  require	  
that	  we	  be	  very	  good.	  Even	  a	  well-­‐rested	  Sam	  may	  end	  up	  harming	  his	  patient.	  And	  even	  a	  
more	  careful	  Claire	  may	  botch	  the	  experiment.	  Perfection	  is	  not	  the	  point.	  In	  fact,	  perfection	  is	  
not	  enough	  to	  satisfy	  RP.	  Sam	  might	  perform	  the	  best	  surgery	  of	  his	  life	  despite	  his	  hangover,	  
and	  Claire	  might	  succeed,	  somehow,	  in	  keeping	  crumbs	  from	  falling	  in	  her	  test	  tubes.	  They	  
would	  still	  violate	  RP.	  Sam	  and	  Claire	  would	  have	  been	  lucky.	  But	  they	  should	  not	  have	  taken	  
the	  risk.	  
	   RP	  is	  modest	  in	  another	  way	  as	  well.	  It	  does	  not	  require	  that	  we	  take	  all	  precautions	  we	  
can.	  We	  only	  have	  to	  take	  those	  precautions	  that	  are	  reasonably	  available	  to	  us.	  Perhaps	  Sam	  
could	  also	  increase	  the	  chances	  of	  doing	  a	  good	  job	  if	  he	  never	  watched	  any	  television.	  And	  
perhaps	  Claire	  could	  keep	  her	  test	  environment	  even	  cleaner	  if	  she	  were	  to	  shave	  her	  head.	  But	  
that	  might	  be	  asking	  too	  much	  of	  our	  surgeons	  and	  chemists.	  The	  principle	  expressed	  by	  PR	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does	  not	  require	  that	  we	  forgo	  the	  ingredients	  of	  a	  normal	  human	  life.	  The	  expectation	  that	  
Sam	  skip	  a	  night	  of	  drinking	  and	  Claire	  postpone	  her	  lunch	  until	  are	  not	  unreasonable	  in	  that	  
way.	  
	   This	  principle	  of	  course	  does	  not	  just	  apply	  to	  surgeons	  and	  chemists.	  It	  applies	  to	  a	  
variety	  of	  roles	  or	  professions,	  including	  that	  of	  the	  political	  philosopher.6	  To	  know	  what	  the	  
implications	  of	  RP	  are	  for	  political	  philosophers,	  we	  have	  to	  ask	  what	  their	  professional	  task	  
consists	  in.	  
	  
(2)	  The	  truth	  about	  politics	  
The	  answer,	  I	  submit,	  is	  straightforward:	  the	  task	  of	  the	  political	  philosopher	  is	  to	  seek	  the	  truth	  
about	  politics.	  
	   If	  that	  sounds	  jarring,	  consider	  again	  the	  case	  of	  Claire.	  The	  problem	  with	  Claire’s	  eating	  
a	  sandwich,	  we	  said,	  is	  that	  it	  significantly	  increases	  the	  risk	  of	  her	  results	  becoming	  distorted.	  
Eating	  a	  sandwich	  introduces	  pollutants	  (breadcrumbs)	  into	  a	  test	  environment	  that	  should	  
remain	  as	  clean	  as	  it	  can	  reasonably	  be.	  Claire	  needs	  such	  an	  environment	  to	  find	  out	  the	  
nature	  of	  the	  chemical	  reaction	  she	  is	  studying,	  and	  not	  the	  other	  type	  of	  reaction	  brought	  
about	  by	  the	  pollutants.	  The	  problem,	  in	  other	  words,	  is	  that	  Claire	  increases	  the	  risk	  that	  her	  
findings	  do	  not	  reflect	  the	  truth	  about	  the	  reaction	  she	  is	  studying.	  
	   Claire’s	  position	  is	  a	  model	  of	  the	  position	  of	  professional	  thinkers	  or	  academics	  in	  
general.	  Academics	  and	  thinkers	  are	  in	  the	  business	  of	  finding	  out	  the	  truth	  about	  their	  subject	  
matter.	  Although	  no	  doubt	  a	  simplification	  of	  their	  respective	  fields,	  chemists	  seek	  the	  truth	  
about	  chemical	  reactions,	  psychologists	  seek	  the	  truth	  about	  the	  human	  mind,	  biologists	  seek	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the	  truth	  about	  living	  nature,	  physicists	  seek	  the	  truth	  about	  the	  physical	  world,	  and	  so	  on.	  
Similarly,	  the	  job	  of	  those	  who	  investigate	  political	  issues	  is	  to	  seek	  the	  truth	  about	  politics.	  
Some	  do	  this	  descriptively	  –	  figuring	  out	  how	  politics	  really	  works	  –	  some	  prescriptively	  –	  
figuring	  out	  how	  politics	  really	  should	  work	  –	  and	  some	  combine	  the	  two.	  
	   This	  is	  not	  to	  deny	  that	  there	  are	  important	  differences	  between	  philosophical	  inquiry	  
and	  the	  kinds	  of	  research	  that	  chemists,	  physicists,	  and	  others	  undertake.	  Philosophy,	  and	  
especially	  political	  philosophy,	  can	  involve	  evaluative	  or	  justificatory	  judgments	  that	  other	  
disciplines	  might	  avoid.	  But	  those	  judgments	  are	  subject	  to	  standards	  of	  correctness	  as	  well.	  
Good	  political	  philosophy	  involves	  understanding,	  interpreting,	  and	  perhaps	  weighing	  different	  
political	  values	  and	  considerations	  in	  the	  right	  way.	  It	  involves	  capturing	  their	  proper	  nature,	  
significance,	  and	  relations.7	  
	   Bearing	  these	  points	  in	  mind,	  then,	  we	  can	  say	  that	  the	  professional	  task	  of	  political	  
philosophers	  is	  similar	  to	  Claire’s.	  Political	  philosophers	  should	  seek	  the	  (complex,	  evaluative)	  
truth	  about	  politics.	  This	  is	  the	  second	  claim	  of	  my	  argument.	  The	  truth	  about	  politics,	  we	  might	  
say,	  is	  the	  telos	  of	  political	  thinking.	  It	  is	  that	  at	  which	  we	  ought	  to	  aim.	  
	   To	  see	  this,	  consider	  two	  further	  imaginary	  cases.	  Imagine	  someone	  whose	  research	  
focuses	  on	  normative	  political	  principles,	  call	  her	  Phoebe	  the	  political	  philosopher.	  Suppose	  
Phoebe	  sets	  out	  to	  develop	  a	  normative	  political	  theory	  that	  she	  is	  quite	  sure	  contains	  a	  
number	  of	  fallacies	  and	  consequently	  prescribes	  the	  opposite	  of	  what	  politics	  should	  be.	  What	  
should	  we	  say	  about	  Phoebe?	  It	  seems	  clear	  that	  she	  is	  at	  least	  being	  dishonest,	  if	  not	  worse.	  
Phoebe	  is	  writing	  books	  and	  articles	  that	  represent	  the	  facts	  about	  political	  philosophy	  in	  
misleading	  ways,	  and	  aim	  to	  convince	  others	  of	  things	  that	  are	  wrong	  (and	  not	  just	  wrong	  in	  the	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sense	  of	  false,	  but	  also	  wrong	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  unjust).	  Phoebe	  knowingly	  introduces	  bad	  
arguments	  into	  the	  philosophical	  debate,	  thus	  moving	  the	  debate	  away	  from	  recognizing	  what	  
should	  really	  be	  done	  politically.8	  
	   This	  example	  is	  extreme.	  But	  many	  of	  us	  are	  familiar	  with	  milder	  cases.	  Suppose	  that	  
Phoebe	  has	  strong	  libertarian	  leanings.	  She	  assiduously	  studies	  the	  works	  of	  John	  Locke,	  Adam	  
Smith,	  Robert	  Nozick,	  Friedrich	  Hayek,	  Murray	  Rothbard,	  and	  other	  noted	  libertarian	  thinkers,	  
but	  refuses	  to	  consider	  or	  even	  read	  the	  works	  of	  Karl	  Marx,	  John	  Rawls,	  G.A.	  Cohen,	  Ronald	  
Dworkin,	  or	  anyone	  else	  who	  has	  objected	  to	  libertarian	  ideals.	  Phoebe	  refuses	  to	  study	  these	  
authors	  because	  they	  are	  not	  libertarian.	  They	  are	  wrong,	  she	  thinks,	  so	  why	  bother?	  
	   Here	  too,	  it	  is	  perfectly	  clear	  that	  Phoebe	  fails	  to	  adequately	  carry	  out	  her	  professional	  
responsibilities.9	  The	  search	  for	  the	  truth	  requires	  that	  researchers	  do	  their	  best	  to	  honestly	  
assess	  and	  evaluate	  all	  the	  relevant	  available	  evidence.	  This	  is	  true	  of	  political	  philosophy	  as	  
much	  as	  it	  is	  true	  of	  chemistry,	  physics,	  or	  any	  other	  discipline.	  Thus,	  Phoebe	  ought	  to	  be	  open-­‐
minded,	  consider	  all	  relevant	  sides	  of	  the	  debate,	  and	  carefully	  weigh	  the	  arguments	  pro	  and	  
con.	  She	  should	  honestly	  try	  to	  find	  out	  which	  normative	  political	  principles	  are	  true,	  and	  which	  
are	  false.	  She	  should	  not	  settle	  for	  reaffirming	  how	  she	  was	  right	  all	  along.	  
	   In	  both	  these	  cases,	  Phoebe	  does	  not	  do	  what	  she	  is	  supposed	  to	  do:	  genuinely	  seek	  the	  
truth	  about	  politics.	  In	  the	  first	  example,	  Phoebe	  fails	  to	  do	  this	  by	  developing	  theories	  that	  are	  
intentionally	  false.	  In	  the	  second,	  by	  using	  research	  methods	  that	  do	  not	  reliable	  bring	  us	  closer	  
to	  the	  truth.	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   When	  we	  combine	  the	  claim	  that	  the	  task	  of	  political	  philosophers	  is	  to	  seek	  the	  truth	  
about	  politics	  with	  the	  principle	  PR,	  it	  follows	  that	  Phoebe’s	  actions	  are	  prima	  facie	  wrong.	  We	  
can	  thus	  formulate	  an	  applied	  version	  of	  PR:	  
PR	  (applied)	  Political	  philosophers	  (and	  others	  like	  them)	  have	  a	  prima	  facie	  moral	  duty	  
to	  make	  a	  reasonable	  effort	  to	  avoid	  those	  things	  that	  predictably	  make	  them	  worse	  at	  
seeking	  the	  truth	  about	  political	  issues.10	  
	   As	  before,	  the	  point	  here	  is	  not	  about	  perfection.	  Phoebe’s	  work	  need	  not	  be	  actually	  
true	  lest	  she	  violates	  her	  professional	  duties.	  That	  would	  be	  implausible.	  Virtually	  all	  theories	  
that	  have	  been	  formulated	  on	  virtually	  all	  topics	  are	  false.	  Newtonian	  physics	  showed	  
Ptolemaic	  systems	  to	  be	  false.	  Einstein	  showed	  that	  Newtonian	  physics	  was	  mistaken.	  And	  it	  is	  
likely	  that	  at	  some	  point	  General	  Relativity	  will	  be	  refuted	  as	  well.	  But	  the	  point	  of	  these	  
theories	  has	  always	  been	  to	  find	  the	  truth.	  They	  were	  part	  of	  a	  debate	  in	  which	  academics	  aim	  
to	  discover	  the	  way	  things	  really	  are.	  And	  that	  is	  how	  it	  should	  have	  been.	  The	  same	  applies	  to	  
Phoebe.	  She	  should	  make	  an	  honest	  effort	  at	  seeking	  the	  truth	  about	  politics.	  
	   The	  applied	  version	  of	  PR	  suggests	  some	  familiar	  conclusions.	  We	  should	  speak	  our	  
minds	  and	  honestly	  represent	  the	  conclusions	  that	  we	  think	  are	  true	  –	  even	  if	  this	  might	  upset	  
our	  audience,	  friends,	  or	  colleagues.	  We	  should	  use	  reliable	  methods	  and	  be	  open	  about	  how	  
we	  have	  reached	  the	  conclusions	  that	  we	  defend.	  And	  this	  is	  true	  irrespective	  of	  the	  truth	  of	  
our	  conclusions.	  
	   But	  there	  are	  other,	  less	  commonly	  recognized	  ways	  in	  which	  political	  philosophers	  can	  
violate	  their	  professional	  duties	  as	  well.	  This	  includes	  being	  politically	  active.	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(3)	  The	  effects	  of	  political	  activism	  
Political	  activism	  violates	  the	  professional	  duty	  of	  political	  philosophers	  not	  to	  impair	  their	  
ability	  to	  seek	  the	  truth	  because	  it	  biases	  our	  thinking	  about	  politics	  in	  important	  ways.	  Over	  
the	  past	  decades	  psychologists	  have	  uncovered	  many	  biases	  shared	  by	  people	  like	  you	  and	  me.	  
These	  biases	  commonly	  lead	  us	  to	  adopt	  beliefs	  and	  commitments	  on	  grounds	  that	  have	  less	  to	  
do	  with	  an	  honest	  and	  rational	  assessment	  of	  the	  available	  evidence,	  and	  more	  with	  things	  such	  
as	  how	  well	  they	  fit	  with	  what	  we	  like,	  already	  believe,	  or	  the	  framework	  in	  which	  they	  are	  
presented.	  Our	  minds	  like	  taking	  shortcuts,	  and	  these	  shortcuts	  bias	  our	  views	  away	  from	  what	  
would	  be	  warranted	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  available	  evidence	  in	  predictable	  ways.	  
	   Daniel	  Kahneman	  describes	  forms	  of	  biased	  thinking	  as	  involving	  a	  process	  he	  calls	  
“substitution”.	  Substitution	  happens	  when	  our	  minds	  use	  the	  answer	  to	  an	  easier	  question	  (one	  
that	  is	  readily	  available	  in	  our	  minds)	  to	  answer	  the	  more	  difficult	  question	  that	  we	  are	  actually	  
asked.	  (Kahneman	  2011,	  12)	  To	  see	  how	  this	  works,	  consider	  an	  experiment	  in	  which	  
participants	  were	  asked	  to	  evaluate	  their	  general	  happiness	  and	  dating	  life.	  The	  participants	  
were	  presented	  with	  the	  following	  two	  questions:	  
• How	  happy	  are	  you	  these	  days?	  
• How	  many	  dates	  did	  you	  have	  last	  month?	  
The	  order	  in	  which	  these	  questions	  appear	  should	  have	  no	  bearing	  on	  our	  answers	  of	  course.	  
But	  it	  does.	  If	  the	  questions	  are	  asked	  in	  the	  order	  above,	  there	  is	  almost	  no	  correlation	  
between	  people’s	  responses	  to	  them.	  When	  they	  are	  switched	  around,	  a	  very	  strong	  
correlation	  appears.	  This	  is	  substitution	  at	  work.	  If	  we	  already	  have	  in	  mind	  a	  view	  of	  our	  love	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life,	  we	  use	  this	  easily	  available	  answer	  to	  respond	  to	  the	  second	  (and	  harder)	  question	  about	  
our	  general	  happiness.	  (Kahneman	  2011,	  101-­‐2;	  Strack	  et	  al.	  1988)11	  
	   The	  process	  of	  substitution	  occurs	  in	  politically	  active	  people.	  In	  fact,	  a	  number	  of	  
studies	  suggest	  that	  the	  dominant	  force	  in	  people’s	  belief-­‐formation	  about	  political	  matters	  is	  
their	  belief	  of	  the	  position	  adopted	  by	  the	  party	  with	  which	  they	  identify.	  That	  is,	  activist	  people	  
support	  policies	  not	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  their	  assessment	  of	  the	  policy’s	  virtues,	  but	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  
the	  position	  of	  the	  group	  or	  political	  party	  with	  which	  they	  identify.	  
	   Cohen	  (2003)	  presented	  groups	  of	  liberal	  and	  conservative	  people	  with	  one	  of	  two	  
versions	  of	  a	  welfare	  policy	  proposal.	  One	  version	  provided	  generous	  benefits,	  whereas	  the	  
other	  version	  provided	  stringent	  benefits.	  When	  no	  other	  information	  was	  supplied	  liberal	  
participants	  preferred	  the	  generous	  policy,	  conservatives	  preferred	  the	  stringent	  one.	  Cohen	  
then	  added	  the	  additional	  information	  whether	  Republicans	  or	  Democrats	  proposed	  a	  certain	  
policy.	  He	  found	  that	  this	  information	  is	  the	  most	  significant	  factor	  in	  determining	  people’s	  
support	  or	  opposition	  for	  the	  policy.	  Liberals	  generally	  support	  the	  generous	  policy	  if	  told	  that	  
Democrats	  support	  it,	  yet	  support	  the	  stringent	  policy	  if	  told	  the	  opposite.	  Conservatives	  
generally	  support	  the	  generous	  policy	  if	  told	  that	  Republicans	  support	  it,	  yet	  support	  the	  
stringent	  policy	  if	  told	  the	  opposite.	  Policy	  content	  had	  no	  significant	  effect	  on	  people’s	  
responses	  in	  these	  cases.	  
	   Cohen	  found	  that	  we	  base	  our	  support	  or	  opposition	  to	  policies	  primarily	  on	  “our”	  
party’s	  position.	  The	  bias	  at	  work	  here	  is	  in-­‐group	  bias.	  Our	  reasoning	  is	  strongly	  sensitive	  to	  the	  
social	  groups	  to	  which	  we	  think	  we	  are	  accountable.	  (Haidt	  2001;	  Haidt	  2013;	  Leary	  2005;	  
Lerner	  and	  Tetlock	  2003)	  Instead	  of	  thinking	  for	  ourselves	  about	  the	  issues,	  we	  adopt	  the	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beliefs	  that	  we	  think	  others	  in	  the	  relevantly	  same	  group	  hold.	  That	  is,	  instead	  of	  doing	  the	  hard	  
work	  of	  thinking	  about	  a	  welfare	  policy	  ourselves,	  we	  use	  the	  group’s	  beliefs	  as	  a	  substitute.12	  
	   In	  a	  similar	  experiment,	  Westen	  (2008)	  asked	  committed	  Democrats	  and	  Republicans	  to	  
evaluate	  the	  behavior	  of	  politicians	  as	  consistent,	  hypocritical,	  trustworthy,	  and	  so	  on.	  He	  found	  
that	  the	  more	  politically	  involved	  participants	  engage	  in	  the	  most	  seriously	  biased	  reasoning.	  
When	  asked	  to	  judge	  the	  missteps	  of	  politicians	  from	  the	  parties	  they	  support,	  partisans	  are	  
prone	  to	  forgive	  and	  look	  for	  excuses.	  When	  asked	  to	  judge	  similar	  missteps	  of	  politicians	  from	  
parties	  they	  oppose,	  partisans	  are	  prone	  to	  condemn	  severely.	  As	  with	  Cohen’s	  experiments,	  
Westen	  found	  that	  politically	  involved	  people’s	  judgments	  are	  heavily	  influenced	  by	  party	  
affiliation.	  Their	  views	  conform	  to	  what	  their	  preferred	  politicians	  and	  groups	  say	  or	  do.13	  (Cf.	  
Fischle	  2000,	  Lakoff	  2009)	  
	   These	  findings	  are	  not	  just	  the	  result	  of	  in-­‐group	  bias.	  Other	  political	  biases	  strengthen	  
these	  effects.	  One	  is	  called	  the	  affect	  heuristic	  or	  motivated	  reasoning.	  This	  bias	  occurs	  when	  
people	  substitute	  what	  they	  like	  and	  dislike	  for	  what	  they	  believe	  is	  true.	  In	  these	  cases,	  our	  
“judgments	  and	  decisions	  are	  guided	  directly	  by	  feelings	  of	  liking	  and	  disliking,	  with	  little	  
deliberation	  or	  reasoning.”	  (Ditto	  et	  al.	  2003;	  Ditto	  et	  al.	  2009;	  Kahneman	  2011,	  12;	  Kunda	  
1990;)	  Another	  example	  is	  the	  halo-­‐effect,	  which	  leads	  us	  to	  interpret	  facts	  in	  ways	  that	  make	  
them	  cohere	  with	  other	  parts	  of	  the	  context	  in	  which	  we	  are	  invested.	  Thus,	  personal	  approval	  
of	  the	  President,	  say,	  and	  approval	  of	  his	  policies	  tend	  to	  go	  hand	  in	  hand.	  (Kahneman	  2011,	  82)	  
The	  availability	  heuristic,	  third,	  makes	  things	  with	  which	  we	  are	  familiar	  seem	  more	  plausible.	  
Politically	  active	  people	  to	  have	  fresh	  in	  their	  minds	  the	  solutions	  proposed	  by	  those	  from	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“their”	  side,	  and	  this	  by	  itself	  makes	  those	  proposals	  seem	  better.	  (Tverski	  and	  Kahneman	  1973;	  
Schwarz	  et	  al.	  1991;	  Zaller	  1992)	  And	  so	  on.	  
	   Empirical	  studies	  of	  voter	  behavior	  support	  these	  findings.	  Lenz	  (2012;	  See	  also	  Bartels	  
2002;	  Jacoby	  1988;	  Logde	  and	  Hemmel,	  1986;	  Rahn	  1993)	  studied	  the	  conduct	  and	  expressed	  
preferences	  of	  voters	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  Canada,	  the	  United	  Kingdom,	  and	  the	  Netherlands.	  
Lenz	  found	  that	  the	  policy	  positions	  of	  politicians	  do	  not	  significantly	  influence	  election	  results.	  
Voters	  rarely	  shift	  their	  votes	  so	  as	  to	  pick	  the	  politician	  who	  agrees	  with	  their	  views	  about	  
what	  policies	  to	  pursue.	  In	  fact	  they	  usually	  do	  the	  exact	  opposite:	  they	  adopt	  the	  views	  their	  
preferred	  politicians	  espouse.	  Lenz	  summarizes:	  
[V]oters	  first	  decide	  they	  like	  a	  politician	  for	  other	  reasons,	  then	  adopt	  his	  or	  her	  policy	  
views…	  Voters	  don’t	  choose	  between	  politicians	  based	  on	  policy	  stances;	  rather,	  voters	  
appear	  to	  adopt	  the	  policies	  that	  their	  favorite	  politicians	  prefer.	  Moreover,	  voters	  seem	  
to	  follow	  rather	  blindly,	  adopting	  a	  particular	  politician’s	  specific	  policies	  even	  when	  
they	  know	  little	  or	  nothing	  of	  that	  politician’s	  overall	  ideology.	  (Lenz	  2012,	  3)14	  
	   The	  biasing	  effects	  of	  political	  activism	  have	  an	  important	  implication	  for	  political	  
thinking.	  Once	  we	  view	  ourselves	  as	  having	  a	  certain	  political	  bend	  or	  affiliation,	  we	  become	  
invested	  in	  that	  self-­‐image.	  We	  naturally	  come	  to	  think	  of	  ourselves	  as	  liberals,	  conservatives,	  
libertarians,	  greens,	  or	  what	  not.	  We	  come	  to	  like	  the	  views	  that	  we	  hold,	  we	  come	  to	  like	  the	  
people	  who	  hold	  similar	  views	  to	  ours,	  and	  these	  likings	  negatively	  affect	  our	  ability	  to	  honestly	  
and	  impartially	  weigh	  the	  evidence.	  Instead	  of	  rationally	  evaluating	  the	  case	  for	  or	  against	  a	  
certain	  position,	  we	  base	  our	  views	  in	  part	  on	  how	  “our”	  group	  thinks,	  how	  it	  makes	  us	  feel	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about	  ourselves	  as	  partisans,	  and	  other	  biasing	  grounds.	  Political	  activism,	  in	  other	  words,	  
biases	  our	  thinking	  about	  political	  issues.	  
	   Suppose	  you	  think	  of	  yourself	  as	  a	  liberal	  and	  sympathize	  with	  the	  Democratic	  Party.	  
You	  endorse	  that	  party’s	  views	  on	  various	  issues	  about	  which	  you	  have	  carefully	  thought	  such	  
as,	  say,	  the	  appropriate	  manner	  and	  level	  of	  taxation,	  foreign	  policy,	  and	  social	  issues.	  
However,	  you	  have	  not	  seriously	  considered	  the	  issue	  of	  gun	  control.	  Suppose	  now	  that	  this	  
suddenly	  becomes	  the	  politically	  issue	  of	  the	  day.	  Upon	  hearing	  that	  the	  Democratic	  Party	  is	  in	  
favor	  of	  tighter	  regulations	  of	  gun	  ownership,	  you	  are	  likely	  to	  adopt	  the	  belief	  that	  this,	  or	  
something	  close	  to	  this,	  is	  the	  correct	  policy.	  Despite	  not	  seriously	  thinking	  about	  the	  issue,	  you	  
will	  form	  a	  certain	  view	  about	  it.	  
	   This	  affects	  our	  thinking	  in	  a	  number	  of	  ways.	  The	  views	  we	  adopt	  in	  these	  ways	  
function	  as	  starting	  points	  for	  our	  thought.	  We	  attribute	  some	  initial	  plausibility	  to	  them	  and,	  as	  
such,	  these	  views	  affect	  our	  future	  thinking	  about	  this	  issue.	  Moreover,	  because	  these	  views	  
are	  now	  part	  of	  how	  we	  see	  the	  political	  or	  moral	  universe,	  they	  affect	  our	  thinking	  about	  other	  
issues	  as	  well.	  They	  become	  part	  of	  the	  larger	  context	  in	  which	  we	  try	  to	  fit	  our	  theories.	  
	   For	  philosophers,	  biasing	  our	  thinking	  about	  such	  issues	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  mere	  political	  
affiliation	  violates	  the	  demands	  of	  professional	  responsibility.	  It	  interferes	  with	  our	  ability	  to	  
honestly	  seek	  the	  truth	  about	  politics.	  Activist	  political	  philosophers,	  then,	  are	  relevantly	  similar	  
to	  Claire	  the	  chemist.	  Claire’s	  decision	  to	  eat	  her	  sandwich	  at	  her	  workplace	  was	  irresponsible	  
because	  it	  increased	  the	  risk	  of	  polluting	  the	  experiment	  and	  corrupting	  her	  findings.	  For	  
political	  philosophers,	  activism	  does	  the	  same.	  Activism	  risks	  polluting	  our	  thought	  and	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corrupting	  our	  findings.	  Just	  as	  Claire	  should	  not	  eat	  her	  sandwich	  at	  her	  workplace,	  political	  
philosophers	  should	  stay	  away	  from	  activism.	  
	   Perhaps	  you	  think	  a	  milder	  stance	  is	  called	  for.	  Perhaps	  philosophers	  simply	  have	  a	  duty	  
to	  try	  their	  best	  to	  avoid	  or	  undo	  their	  biases?	  It	  is	  certainly	  true	  that	  our	  biases	  are	  not	  
inescapable.	  We	  can	  fight	  them	  by	  actively	  seeking	  out	  dissenting	  views	  and	  opinions,	  by	  
forcing	  ourselves	  to	  put	  opposing	  positions	  in	  their	  strongest	  light,	  by	  actively	  engaging	  and	  
talking	  to	  those	  who	  disagree	  with	  us,	  by	  focusing	  on	  the	  strengths	  of	  their	  views	  rather	  than	  
their	  weaknesses,	  and	  so	  on.	  (Lewandowsky	  et	  al.	  2012)	  
	   Certainly	  philosophers	  have	  a	  duty	  to	  try	  and	  correct	  their	  biases.	  But	  it	  would	  be	  a	  
serious	  mistake	  to	  stop	  here.	  Consider	  again	  Claire	  and	  Sam.	  It	  is	  not	  enough	  for	  Claire	  to	  just	  
try	  her	  best	  to	  catch	  all	  the	  breadcrumbs	  before	  they	  fall	  into	  the	  test	  tubes.	  And	  it	  is	  not	  
enough	  for	  Sam	  to	  just	  take	  a	  cold	  shower	  and	  drink	  lots	  of	  coffee	  to	  overcome	  his	  hangover.	  
Claire	  and	  Sam	  still	  violate	  their	  professional	  duties.	  They	  act	  wrongly	  because	  of	  the	  risks	  they	  
took	  –	  Claire	  and	  Sam	  made	  success	  unnecessarily	  unlikely.	  The	  same	  point	  applies	  to	  activist	  
political	  philosophers.	  Avoiding	  bias	  is	  not	  impossible,	  but	  it	  is	  really	  difficult.	  We	  are	  typically	  
biased	  without	  noticing	  it	  and	  we	  tend	  to	  fall	  back	  into	  bias	  even	  when	  we	  are	  aware	  of	  it.	  
(Lilienfeld	  et	  al.	  2009;	  Pronin	  et	  al.	  2002)	  Correcting	  bias	  requires	  active	  vigilance	  on	  an	  ongoing	  
basis,	  and	  this	  is	  hard	  work	  indeed.15	  Being	  politically	  active	  thus	  involves	  seriously	  exacerbating	  
the	  risk	  of	  becoming	  biased	  about	  political	  issues.	  This	  is	  the	  sense	  in	  which	  activist	  
philosophers	  violate	  their	  professional	  duties.	  They	  make	  seeking	  the	  truth	  about	  political	  
issues	  needlessly	  difficult.	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   Does	  not	  the	  method	  of	  philosophy	  prevent	  biased	  thinking?16	  After	  all,	  philosophers	  
have	  to	  formulate	  logically	  valid	  arguments	  and	  spell	  out	  the	  premises	  on	  which	  their	  
conclusions	  depend.	  Unfortunately	  not.	  Bias	  does	  not	  just	  affect	  the	  conclusions	  we	  are	  likely	  to	  
accept.	  It	  also	  affects	  our	  assessment	  of	  the	  evidence,	  and	  thus	  the	  premises	  we	  are	  likely	  to	  
accept.	  We	  evaluate	  the	  importance,	  credibility,	  and	  relevance	  of	  evidence	  for	  and	  against	  a	  
certain	  view	  depending	  on	  whether	  it	  supports	  or	  contradicts	  the	  views	  we	  already	  hold.	  You	  
are	  more	  likely	  to	  positively	  judge	  evidence	  that	  supports	  views	  you	  hold,	  and	  negatively	  judge	  
evidence	  against	  it.	  Kahneman	  (2011,	  103)	  explains:	  
Your	  political	  preference	  determines	  the	  arguments	  that	  you	  find	  compelling.	  If	  you	  like	  
the	  current	  health	  policy,	  you	  believe	  its	  benefits	  are	  substantial	  and	  its	  costs	  more	  
manageable	  than	  the	  costs	  of	  alternatives.	  If	  you	  are	  a	  hawk	  in	  your	  attitude	  toward	  
other	  nations,	  you	  probably	  think	  they	  are	  relatively	  weak	  and	  likely	  to	  submit	  to	  your	  
country’s	  will.	  If	  you	  are	  a	  dove	  you	  probably	  think	  they	  are	  strong	  and	  will	  not	  be	  easily	  
coerced.	  
	   Consider	  again	  the	  example	  of	  gun	  control.	  If	  “your”	  party	  supports	  tighter	  regulations,	  
your	  assessment	  of	  the	  evidence	  will	  be	  affected	  in	  favor	  or	  against	  such	  regulations.	  You	  are	  
likely	  to	  think	  guns	  are	  dangerous,	  perhaps	  because	  you	  end	  up	  focusing	  on	  stories	  in	  the	  news	  
that	  involved	  harm.	  And	  you	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  unimpressed	  by	  their	  potential	  benefits,	  perhaps	  
because	  you	  discount	  news	  stories	  that	  involve	  people	  protecting	  themselves	  and	  exaggerate	  
the	  quality	  of	  police-­‐protection.	  Similarly,	  you	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  sympathetic	  to	  the	  regulatory	  and	  
risk-­‐reducing	  functions	  of	  the	  state.	  And	  you	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  unimpressed	  with	  the	  recreational	  
value	  of	  gun	  ownership.	  If	  “your”	  party	  holds	  the	  opposite	  view,	  your	  assessment	  of	  the	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evidence	  will	  be	  affected	  accordingly.	  This	  effect	  harms	  even	  our	  ability	  to	  interpret	  simple	  
statistical	  evidence.	  (Kahan	  et	  al.	  2013)	  As	  a	  result,	  biased	  people	  can	  come	  up	  with	  remarkably	  
sophisticated	  rationalizations	  for	  why,	  upon	  reflection,	  their	  earlier	  unreflective	  views	  turn	  out	  
to	  be	  more	  or	  less	  correct.	  (Haidt	  2013;	  Kuhn	  1989;	  Kunda	  1990;	  Mercier	  and	  Sperber	  2010;	  
Nickerson	  1998;	  Pyszczynski	  and	  Greenberg	  1987;	  Shaw	  1996)	  
	   For	  philosophers	  even	  provisionally	  adopting	  biased	  beliefs	  is	  dangerous,	  therefore.	  
Once	  those	  beliefs	  are	  in	  place,	  they	  become	  difficult	  to	  dislodge.	  When	  we	  (tentatively)	  take	  a	  
stand	  on	  certain	  conclusions,	  we	  also	  take	  a	  stand	  on	  what	  premises	  we	  are	  willing	  to	  endorse	  
as	  true.	  Kahneman	  uses	  a	  telling	  term	  for	  this	  –	  he	  calls	  it	  the	  primacy	  of	  conclusions.	  For	  
political	  philosophers	  primacy	  should	  lie	  with	  the	  arguments.17	  
	   The	  correct	  response	  to	  this	  problem,	  then,	  is	  not	  to	  invite	  these	  biases	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  
If	  we	  have	  no	  party	  or	  movement	  that	  is	  “ours”,	  we	  cannot	  be	  biased	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  our	  
allegiances.	  We	  should	  replace	  the	  ideal	  of	  the	  political	  philosopher	  as	  socially	  engaged	  and	  
politically	  active,	  with	  another	  ideal:	  that	  of	  the	  political	  philosopher	  as	  the	  disinterested	  seeker	  
of	  the	  truth.18	  
	  
(4)	  Some	  objections	  	  
Let	  me	  summarize	  the	  argument	  so	  far:	  
(1) People	  who	  take	  up	  a	  certain	  role	  or	  profession	  thereby	  acquire	  a	  prima	  facie	  moral	  
duty	  to	  make	  a	  reasonable	  effort	  to	  avoid	  those	  things	  that	  predictably	  make	  them	  
worse	  at	  their	  tasks	  
(2) The	  task	  of	  political	  philosophers	  is	  to	  seek	  the	  truth	  about	  political	  issues	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(3) Therefore,	  political	  philosophers	  have	  a	  prima	  facie	  moral	  duty	  to	  make	  a	  reasonable	  
effort	  to	  avoid	  those	  things	  that	  predictably	  make	  them	  worse	  at	  seeking	  the	  truth	  
about	  political	  issues	  
(4) Being	  politically	  active	  predictably	  makes	  us	  worse	  at	  seeking	  the	  truth	  about	  political	  
issues	  
(5) Therefore,	  political	  philosophers	  have	  a	  prima	  facie	  moral	  duty	  to	  avoid	  being	  politically	  
active	  
Anyone	  who	  wants	  to	  resist	  the	  conclusion	  will	  have	  to	  resist	  at	  least	  one	  of	  the	  argument’s	  
premises.	  I	  have	  made	  a	  case	  for	  each	  of	  them.	  This	  section	  discusses	  some	  possible	  objections.	  
	   (A)	  A	  first	  possible	  concern	  is	  that	  something	  is	  missing	  from	  premise	  (4).	  The	  principle	  
in	  (1)	  requires	  that	  we	  avoid	  political	  activity	  only	  if	  doing	  so	  can	  be	  reasonably	  expected	  of	  us.	  
But	  (4)	  does	  not	  say	  that	  avoiding	  political	  activism	  is	  reasonable.	  Might	  it	  be	  unreasonable	  to	  
expect	  philosophers	  to	  avoid	  political	  activism?	  
	   One	  reason	  why	  the	  demand	  might	  be	  thought	  unreasonable	  is	  because	  it	  puts	  
excessive	  burdens	  on	  political	  philosophers.	  But	  this	  is	  hard	  to	  maintain.	  Many	  people	  stay	  out	  
of	  political	  activism	  and	  they	  do	  just	  fine.	  Activism	  is	  not	  a	  necessary	  ingredient	  of	  a	  good	  life.	  
And	  philosophers	  who	  stay	  out	  of	  politics	  will	  have	  more	  time	  to	  spend	  on	  other	  things	  they	  
care	  about	  and	  make	  life	  worthwhile.	  Of	  course	  it	  may	  be	  that	  certain	  philosophers	  simply	  love	  
their	  activism	  so	  much	  that	  they	  cannot	  bear	  the	  idea	  of	  giving	  it	  up.	  But	  that	  does	  not	  make	  
the	  demand	  unreasonable;	  it	  makes	  them	  unfit	  for	  political	  philosophy.	  
	   Another	  reason	  the	  demand	  may	  seem	  unreasonable	  is	  because	  of	  the	  burdens	  it	  would	  
put	  on	  society.	  Now	  in	  one	  sense	  the	  impact	  of	  philosopher	  withdrawal	  would	  be	  negligible.	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Philosophers	  make	  up	  a	  very	  small	  segment	  of	  the	  population,	  incapable	  of	  making	  a	  noticeable	  
numerical	  difference.	  And	  many	  people	  in	  even	  the	  healthiest	  democracies	  around	  the	  world	  
are	  not	  politically	  active	  and,	  in	  the	  grand	  scheme	  of	  things,	  these	  democracies	  seem	  to	  do	  just	  
fine.	  But	  there	  is	  another,	  more	  sensible	  worry	  here.	  Perhaps	  withdrawal	  by	  political	  
philosophers	  from	  activism	  would	  harm	  the	  political	  process	  not	  because	  of	  the	  quantitative	  
difference	  it	  would	  make,	  but	  because	  of	  its	  qualitative	  difference.	  Perhaps,	  that	  is,	  a	  healthy	  
polity	  needs	  philosopher	  activism	  so	  that	  their	  ideas	  become	  part	  of	  the	  public	  debate.	  
	   Suppose	  we	  agree.	  That	  still	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  philosophers	  themselves	  must	  be	  
politically	  active.	  Philosophers	  can	  introduce	  good	  philosophical	  ideas	  and	  reasoning	  in	  ways	  
that	  do	  not	  involve	  their	  personal	  activism	  and	  allegiance.	  They	  can	  publish	  in	  academic	  outlets.	  
They	  can	  write	  non-­‐partisan	  op-­‐ed	  pieces.	  They	  can	  talk	  to	  politically	  active	  people.	  And	  so	  on.	  
The	  demand	  that	  philosophers	  refrain	  from	  personal	  activism	  is	  not	  a	  demand	  for	  removing	  
good	  political	  philosophy	  from	  the	  public	  realm	  or	  debate.	  
	   Moreover,	  if	  philosophers	  have	  a	  duty	  to	  do	  their	  jobs	  well,	  the	  same	  is	  true	  of	  political	  
activists.	  Responsible	  activists	  should	  make	  sure	  they	  push	  for	  genuine	  improvements	  to	  
society.	  And	  this	  requires	  informing	  oneself	  of	  the	  best	  available	  evidence	  about	  political	  
principles.	  Activists,	  in	  other	  words,	  should	  familiarize	  themselves	  with	  the	  best	  available	  
political	  philosophy.19	  
	   I	  am	  urging,	  then,	  for	  a	  division	  of	  labor.	  It	  is	  the	  job	  of	  political	  philosophers	  to	  find	  out	  
the	  correct	  principles	  for	  politics.	  It	  is	  the	  job	  of	  activists	  to	  implement	  these.	  The	  focus	  of	  each	  
should	  be	  firmly	  on	  their	  own	  task.	  Activists	  should	  not	  produce	  political	  philosophy	  but	  
consume	  it.	  Philosophers	  should	  produce	  political	  philosophy	  worth	  consuming.	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   We	  tend	  to	  accept	  this	  division	  of	  labor	  in	  our	  assessment	  of	  activists.	  Few	  think	  the	  
David	  Axelrods	  and	  Karl	  Roves	  of	  this	  world	  are	  morally	  lacking	  because	  they	  do	  not	  undertake	  
serious	  political	  philosophy.	  We	  understand	  that	  they	  cannot	  be	  expected	  to	  do	  this.	  They	  do	  
not	  have	  the	  time,	  knowledge,	  or	  ability.	  And	  we	  accept,	  even,	  that	  it	  might	  be	  imprudent	  for	  
them	  to	  engage	  in	  serious	  philosophy	  –	  it	  might	  make	  them	  less	  effective	  as	  activists	  because	  of	  
the	  doubt	  that	  it	  typically	  creates.	  But	  if	  this	  is	  good	  enough	  for	  activists,	  it	  should	  be	  good	  
enough	  for	  philosophers	  too.	  
	   (B)	  A	  second	  objection	  holds	  that	  the	  conclusion	  of	  my	  argument	  cannot	  be	  true	  
because	  the	  principle	  of	  responsible	  professionalism	  mentioned	  in	  premise	  (1)	  is	  suspect.	  The	  
worry	  about	  this	  principle	  is	  that	  it	  prevents	  people	  from	  doing	  things	  that	  they	  should	  do	  as	  
good	  citizens.	  Political	  activism	  is	  part	  of	  civic	  virtue20	  and	  what	  is	  virtue	  for	  some	  cannot	  be	  
vice	  for	  others.	  
	   In	  one	  sense	  it	  is	  true	  that	  what	  is	  virtue	  for	  some	  cannot	  be	  vice	  for	  others.	  If	  
generosity	  is	  a	  virtue	  for	  some	  then	  it	  is	  a	  virtue	  for	  everyone.	  But	  it	  is	  false	  to	  say	  that	  if	  an	  act	  
is	  virtuous	  in	  one	  case,	  it	  must	  be	  virtuous	  in	  all	  cases.	  Suppose	  you	  want	  to	  start	  a	  business	  and	  
need	  to	  apply	  for	  a	  permit.	  It	  would	  be	  generous	  for	  me	  to	  pay	  your	  application	  fee.	  But	  this	  
does	  not	  mean	  that	  the	  bureaucrat	  who	  waives	  the	  application	  fee	  of	  his	  friend	  is	  generous	  as	  
well.	  Virtue	  needs	  to	  be	  exercised	  with	  sensitivity	  to	  circumstances	  and	  context.	  Doing	  the	  
outward	  act	  that	  in	  most	  circumstances	  constitutes	  virtuous	  behavior	  under	  other	  conditions	  
may	  not	  be	  virtuous,	  and	  is	  sometimes	  vicious.	  
	   So	  it	  does	  not	  follow	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  political	  philosophers	  should	  display	  civic	  virtue	  
that	  they	  must	  do	  so	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  others	  do.	  Roughly	  speaking,	  civic	  virtue	  requires	  that	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one	  be	  a	  good	  member	  of	  the	  community,	  someone	  who	  contributes	  to	  the	  common	  good.	  This	  
can	  be	  done	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  ways,	  not	  all	  of	  which	  involve	  political	  involvement.	  We	  can	  display	  
civic	  virtue	  by	  volunteering	  for	  charitable	  organizations,	  by	  helping	  to	  solve	  local	  problems	  in	  
our	  communities,	  by	  offering	  our	  service	  to	  people	  who	  lack	  the	  means	  to	  purchase	  it,	  and	  so	  
on.	  The	  argument	  above	  implies,	  then,	  that	  political	  philosophers	  should	  exercise	  their	  civic	  
virtue	  in	  these	  ways.21	  
	   (C)	  Finally,	  consider	  premise	  (2),	  the	  idea	  that	  political	  philosophers	  should	  seek	  the	  
truth	  about	  political	  issues.	  Some	  take	  Marx’s	  remark	  that	  the	  point	  of	  philosophy	  is	  not	  to	  
understand	  the	  world	  but	  to	  change	  it	  as	  the	  rejection	  of	  this	  premise.	  In	  fact,	  there	  are	  a	  
number	  of	  different	  ways	  to	  challenge	  this	  point.	  I	  will	  consider	  four	  versions	  of	  this	  objection:	  
(i)	  the	  need	  for	  social	  change	  trumps	  the	  imperative	  to	  find	  the	  truth,	  (ii)	  there	  is	  no	  truth	  to	  
political	  philosophy,	  (iii)	  the	  profession	  as	  a	  whole	  ought	  to	  seek	  the	  truth,	  but	  not	  individual	  
philosophers,	  and	  (iv)	  the	  philosopher	  cannot	  uncover	  the	  truth	  about	  politics	  without	  personal	  
activism.	  
	   The	  problem	  with	  the	  first	  version	  of	  this	  objection	  is	  easy	  to	  spot.	  Suppose	  that	  the	  
need	  to	  make	  the	  world	  a	  better	  place	  really	  does	  trump	  considerations	  of	  truth.	  That	  raises	  an	  
obvious	  question:	  how	  should	  we	  go	  about	  this?	  In	  order	  to	  make	  the	  world	  a	  better	  place,	  we	  
first	  need	  to	  know	  what	  would	  make	  it	  better.	  But	  to	  ask	  this	  question	  is	  to	  ask	  the	  central	  
question	  of	  political	  philosophy.	  And	  to	  answer	  it	  we	  need	  to	  know	  the	  truth	  about	  political	  
philosophy.	  In	  this	  sense,	  truth	  cannot	  be	  avoided.	  
	   But	  what	  if	  there	  is	  no	  truth	  in	  political	  philosophy	  at	  all?	  Surely	  political	  philosophers	  
cannot	  have	  a	  duty	  to	  seek	  the	  truth	  if	  truth	  does	  not	  exist.	  This	  objection	  cannot	  be	  so	  readily	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dismissed.	  After	  all,	  those	  of	  us	  who	  seek	  the	  truth	  about	  politics	  might	  simply	  be	  mistaken	  
about	  what	  we	  do.	  But	  the	  objection	  does	  not	  bode	  well	  for	  the	  profession	  of	  political	  
philosophy.	  If	  there	  is	  no	  truth	  to	  be	  discovered	  about	  political	  principles,	  then	  what	  exactly	  are	  
political	  philosophers	  supposed	  to	  be	  doing?	  What	  is	  left	  of	  the	  “theories”	  and	  “arguments”	  we	  
develop?	  And	  why	  would	  developing	  these	  theories	  and	  arguments,	  with	  all	  their	  intricate	  
detail	  and	  sophistication,	  be	  worth	  our	  time?	  With	  the	  truth	  out	  of	  the	  window,	  little	  of	  
importance	  seems	  to	  be	  left.22	  
	   I	  do	  not	  mean	  that	  truth	  is	  the	  sine	  qua	  non	  of	  a	  worthwhile	  academic	  discipline.	  
Perhaps	  those	  who	  specialize	  in	  music,	  theater,	  or	  dance	  do	  not	  seek	  to	  uncover	  truth	  
(although	  this	  is	  to	  overgeneralize	  considerably).	  Yet	  these	  endeavors	  seem	  worthwhile	  
nonetheless.	  However,	  these	  disciplines	  aim	  at	  something	  else	  of	  value,	  such	  as	  beauty	  or	  
entertainment.	  Political	  philosophy	  without	  truth	  does	  not	  have	  a	  similar	  aim.	  It	  sounds	  more	  
like	  therapy	  than	  an	  important	  line	  of	  inquiry.23	  
	   The	  third	  variation	  of	  this	  objection	  holds	  that	  even	  if	  the	  profession	  of	  political	  
philosophy	  as	  a	  whole	  should	  seek	  the	  truth,	  this	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  individual	  philosophers	  
should	  do	  so	  as	  well.	  The	  idea	  here	  is	  analogous	  to	  John	  Stuart	  Mill’s	  famous	  defense	  of	  free	  
speech.	  Perhaps	  the	  community	  of	  philosophers	  is	  most	  likely	  to	  find	  the	  truth	  if	  many	  different	  
views,	  including	  mistaken	  ones,	  were	  allowed	  to	  be	  voiced.	  Does	  this	  not	  mean	  that	  
philosophers	  should	  be	  unabashed	  partisans?	  (Cf.	  Muirhead	  2006;	  White	  and	  Ypi	  2011)	  
	   This	  is	  implausible.	  While	  Millian	  rights	  to	  free	  speech	  protect	  us	  even	  when	  we	  say	  
things	  that	  are	  false,	  stupid,	  or	  hurtful,	  they	  do	  not	  justify	  us	  in	  saying	  such	  things.	  People	  with	  
rights	  to	  free	  speech	  still	  have	  the	  moral	  duty	  to	  refrain	  from	  deception	  and	  lies.	  The	  same	  goes	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for	  philosophers.	  The	  search	  for	  philosophical	  truth	  is	  immensely	  difficult.	  And	  no	  doubt	  the	  
best	  we	  can	  do	  as	  a	  profession	  is	  to	  allow	  all	  philosophical	  voices	  in	  the	  debate,	  including	  biased	  
ones.	  But	  this	  is	  no	  call	  for	  biased	  philosophy.	  A	  good	  debate	  requires	  good	  participants,	  and	  it	  
is	  hard	  to	  see	  how	  the	  debate	  should	  aim	  at	  the	  truth	  while	  its	  participants	  do	  not.	  
	   A	  final	  version	  of	  this	  objection	  holds	  that	  seeking	  the	  truth	  about	  political	  issues	  in	  fact	  
requires	  personal	  activism	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  philosopher.	  Ypi	  (2011)	  has	  argued	  that	  the	  
activist	  “avant-­‐garde”	  plays	  an	  especially	  important	  role	  for	  political	  philosophy	  because	  first-­‐
hand	  political	  involvement	  reveals	  important	  issues,	  details,	  and	  nuances	  for	  political	  
philosophy.	  These	  will	  be	  overlooked	  by	  those	  who	  do	  philosophy	  from	  the	  armchair,	  so	  to	  
speak.	  Based	  on	  observations	  like	  Ypi’s,	  it	  might	  be	  thought	  that	  understanding	  the	  truth	  about	  
political	  philosophy	  requires	  political	  activism	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  philosopher.	  
	   Even	  if	  Ypi	  is	  right	  about	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  “avant-­‐garde”	  that	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  
philosophers	  should	  be	  activists.	  There	  is	  a	  difference	  between	  saying	  (a)	  that	  political	  activism	  
provides	  crucial	  insights	  for	  political	  philosophy	  that	  would	  otherwise	  not	  be	  available,	  and	  (b)	  
that	  one	  cannot	  access	  these	  insights	  without	  engaging	  in	  activism	  oneself.	  The	  former	  may	  be	  
plausible,	  but	  the	  latter	  is	  not.	  To	  see	  this,	  compare	  the	  example	  of	  slavery.	  It	  seems	  plausible	  
that	  we	  cannot	  understand	  the	  full	  depths	  and	  complexities	  of	  the	  evils	  of	  slavery	  from	  the	  
armchair.	  Responsible	  philosophical	  reflection	  needs	  to	  take	  into	  account	  the	  experiences	  and	  
insights	  of	  those	  who	  have	  been	  slaves,	  and	  pay	  close	  attention	  to	  their	  narratives	  and	  
demands.	  But	  it	  does	  not	  follow	  that	  anyone	  who	  has	  not	  been	  a	  slave	  cannot	  understand	  what	  
makes	  slavery	  wrong.	  If	  that	  were	  true,	  few	  in	  the	  West	  could	  still	  understand	  the	  evil	  of	  slavery	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today.	  The	  wrongs	  of	  slavery	  are	  moral	  wrongs,	  wrongs	  of	  degradation,	  humiliation,	  
oppression,	  and	  more.	  And	  these	  wrongs	  are	  universal	  across	  humanity	  and	  time.24	  
	   The	  lesson	  of	  Ypi’s	  argument	  about	  the	  “avant-­‐garde,”	  if	  successful,	  therefore	  is	  that	  
political	  philosophers	  should	  pay	  special	  attention	  to	  the	  insights	  of	  political	  activists.	  It	  is	  not	  
that	  they	  must	  be	  activists	  themselves.25	  
	  
(5)	  Conclusion	  
Political	  philosophers	  have	  a	  prima	  facie	  professional	  duty	  not	  to	  be	  politically	  active.	  The	  
conclusion,	  no	  doubt,	  is	  paradoxical.	  Those	  who	  are	  most	  serious	  about	  thinking	  about	  political	  
issues	  should	  be	  the	  least	  politically	  active.	  
	   As	  a	  profession,	  we	  do	  a	  poor	  job	  in	  living	  up	  to	  this	  standard.	  Many	  academics	  I	  know	  
donate	  to	  campaigns,	  put	  signs	  in	  their	  yards,	  tell	  students	  what	  to	  think	  about	  the	  issues	  of	  the	  
day,	  and	  are	  politically	  active	  in	  other	  ways.	  The	  argument	  of	  this	  paper	  shows	  that	  this	  is	  not	  a	  
responsible	  attitude.	  Marx	  and	  Plato	  can	  be	  forgiven	  for	  their	  psychologically	  naïve	  views.	  We	  
should	  do	  better.26	  
	   As	  political	  philosophers,	  we	  find	  ourselves	  in	  a	  precarious	  situation.	  For	  many	  of	  us	  it	  is	  
difficult	  to	  separate	  our	  activism	  from	  the	  reasons	  why	  we	  became	  attracted	  to	  thinking	  about	  
political	  issues	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  We	  choose	  our	  professions,	  fields,	  and	  topics	  because	  they	  
matter.	  And	  so	  we	  may	  begin	  our	  philosophical	  journeys	  with	  a	  number	  of	  judgments	  and	  
principles	  already	  in	  mind.	  As	  a	  result,	  we	  start	  in	  inevitably	  biased	  ways.	  But	  while	  this	  is	  
understandable,	  it	  does	  not	  mean	  we	  can	  afford	  to	  ignore	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  continued	  activism	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  idea	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  misguided	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  activism	  includes	  much	  more.	  In	  
that	  case	  my	  argument	  should	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  read	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  showing	  that	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  range	  of	  such	  activities	  are	  morally	  
problematic	  for	  political	  philosophers.	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  The	  duty	  is	  “prima	  facie”	  because	  it	  can	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  overridden	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  outweighed	  by	  more	  important	  and	  
countervailing	  moral	  considerations.	  The	  principle	  demands	  precautions	  against	  things	  that	  risk	  
making	  us	  worse	  at	  our	  tasks	  compared	  to	  a	  situation	  in	  which	  we	  did	  not	  take	  those	  
precautions.	  
4	  Of	  course	  no	  test	  environment	  is	  ever	  entirely	  clean.	  But	  this	  does	  not	  change	  the	  point	  that	  
Claire	  should	  avoid	  introducing	  unnecessary	  pollutants.	  As	  will	  become	  clear	  below,	  very	  much	  
the	  same	  is	  true	  of	  political	  philosophers.	  
5	  The	  principle	  PR	  is	  a	  role-­‐based	  principle.	  So	  while	  I	  will	  talk	  throughout	  about	  jobs,	  
professions,	  or	  vocations,	  nothing	  in	  my	  argument	  depends	  on	  having	  a	  job	  title	  or	  being	  paid	  
to	  think	  about	  political	  issues.	  That	  said,	  people	  who	  do	  get	  paid	  to	  think	  about	  political	  issues	  
are	  likely	  under	  an	  additional	  duty	  to	  the	  same	  effect.	  They	  may	  have	  fiduciary	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  to	  their	  
employers	  to	  take	  the	  precautions	  mentioned	  in	  RP.	  This	  bolsters	  my	  conclusions.	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6	  Recall,	  while	  I	  speak	  of	  political	  philosophy,	  my	  argument	  is	  directed	  at	  anyone	  who	  studies	  
politically	  relevant	  issues,	  regardless	  of	  discipline.	  
7	  This	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  there	  must	  be	  a	  single	  right	  understanding,	  interpretation,	  or	  
weighting.	  Perhaps	  the	  truth	  is	  that	  there	  are	  a	  number	  of	  ways	  in	  which	  political	  societies	  can	  
be	  organized,	  each	  no	  more	  correct	  than	  the	  others.	  
8	  Of	  course	  it	  can	  make	  sense	  sometimes	  to	  present	  a	  fallacious	  argument	  in	  order	  to	  make	  a	  
point,	  say	  about	  that	  style	  of	  argument	  or	  the	  particular	  fallacy	  it	  contains.	  But	  that	  requires	  
that	  we	  announce	  that	  the	  argument	  is	  fallacious	  and	  explain	  the	  mistake.	  Phoebe,	  we	  are	  
imagining,	  does	  no	  such	  thing.	  
9	  The	  same	  problem,	  of	  course,	  arises	  if	  Phoebe	  were	  to	  do	  the	  reverse.	  
10	  This	  claim	  does	  not	  rely	  on	  any	  particular	  theory	  of	  the	  truth	  about	  politics,	  or	  truth	  in	  
general.	  One	  might	  believe	  that	  things	  are	  true	  if	  they	  correspond	  to	  the	  way	  things	  actually	  
are,	  if	  they	  cohere	  in	  some	  relevant	  way,	  or	  something	  else.	  And	  one	  might	  hold	  that	  the	  truth	  
about	  politics	  is	  “out	  there”	  to	  be	  discovered,	  (partially)	  the	  result	  of	  our	  justificatory	  practices,	  
or	  something	  else.	  Whatever	  truth	  in	  these	  cases	  might	  come	  to,	  my	  claim	  here	  is	  that	  
philosophers	  should	  seek	  it.	  
11	  Similar	  effects	  are	  found	  with	  other	  irrelevant	  influences,	  such	  as	  the	  weather.	  (Schwartz	  and	  
Clore	  1983)	  
12	  In-­‐group	  bias	  is	  nasty.	  Tajfel	  (1981)	  conducted	  experiments	  in	  which	  he	  randomly	  assigned	  
subjects	  to	  groups.	  He	  would	  then	  tell	  subjects	  that	  members	  of	  other	  groups	  shared	  some	  
imaginary	  frivolous	  trait.	  Tajfel	  found	  that	  subjects	  quickly	  developed	  strong	  positive	  feelings	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toward	  members	  of	  their	  own	  group,	  and	  distrust	  toward	  members	  of	  other	  groups.	  	  See	  also	  
Tajfel	  (1982),	  Taffel	  and	  Turner	  (1979).	  For	  a	  detailed	  study	  of	  the	  effects	  of	  in-­‐group	  bias	  on	  
political	  reasoning,	  see	  Haidt	  (2013).	  
13	  Worryingly,	  magnetic	  imaging	  of	  the	  brain	  that	  such	  biased	  reasoning	  is	  in	  fact	  pleasurable,	  
making	  it	  hard	  to	  resist.	  (Westen,	  Blagoc,	  Harenski,	  Klits,	  and	  Hamann	  2007;	  Haidt	  2013,	  189)	  
14	  The	  one	  exception	  to	  Lenz’s	  findings	  concerns	  relatively	  objective	  measures	  of	  economic	  
performance.	  
15	  Kahneman	  (2011,	  28)	  suggests	  it	  may	  be	  more	  demanding	  than	  is	  good	  for	  us.	  In	  general,	  
people	  do	  not	  like	  to	  correct	  their	  biases.	  Mutz	  (2006)	  shows	  that	  politically	  engaged	  people	  are	  
less	  likely	  to	  surround	  themselves	  with	  those	  who	  have	  politically	  dissenting	  views.	  We	  find	  
political	  disagreement	  uncomfortable	  and	  this	  reinforces	  the	  processes	  of	  bias.	  Moreover,	  
correcting	  bias	  has	  its	  own	  problems.	  It	  can	  lead	  to	  overcompensation	  and	  thus	  bias	  in	  the	  
opposite	  direction.	  (Nyhan	  and	  Reifler	  2010)	  
16	  We	  are	  neither	  too	  smart	  nor	  too	  educated	  to	  be	  biased.	  Intelligence	  is	  at	  best	  a	  poor	  guard	  
against	  bias.	  (Kahneman	  2011,	  49;	  Brennan	  2011,	  104)	  In	  fact,	  smarter	  people	  are	  less	  aware	  of	  
their	  biases.	  (West,	  Meserve,	  and	  Stanovich	  2012)	  Nor	  does	  education	  protect	  us	  against	  bias.	  
(Perkins	  et	  al.;	  Haidt	  2013,	  94-­‐5)	  
17	  The	  problem	  is	  especially	  serious	  given	  that	  the	  dominant	  method	  in	  political	  philosophy	  
(“reflective	  equilibrium”)	  puts	  a	  prize	  on	  conclusions	  fitting	  our	  intuitions.	  (Daniels	  2011)	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18	  Activism	  may	  lead	  us	  to	  violate	  other	  professional	  responsibilities	  as	  well.	  Ideological	  bias	  
seems	  to	  negatively	  affect	  hiring	  decisions,	  for	  example.	  See	  Inbar	  and	  Lammers	  (2012)	  and	  
Rothman	  et	  al.	  (2005).	  
19	  Of	  course	  they	  too	  should	  try	  to	  avoid	  being	  biased.	  But,	  not	  being	  philosophers,	  they	  are	  not	  
under	  the	  same	  special	  obligation	  to	  do	  so.	  
20	  Some	  defend	  the	  even	  stronger	  view	  that	  partisanship	  is	  part	  of	  civic	  virtue.	  (Rosenblum	  
2010;	  Muirhead	  2006)	  
21	  These	  are	  public,	  non-­‐political	  ways	  of	  displaying	  civic	  virtue.	  Brennan	  (2011,	  ch.	  2)	  argues	  
that	  even	  non-­‐public,	  non-­‐political	  actions	  can	  be	  part	  of	  civic	  virtue.	  
22	  Note	  that	  if	  this	  objection	  somehow	  gets	  philosophers	  off	  the	  hook	  (without	  destroying	  the	  
value	  of	  their	  profession),	  the	  same	  is	  not	  true	  for	  academics	  asking	  descriptive	  questions	  about	  
politics.	  Presumably	  there	  is	  a	  truth	  about	  the	  way	  the	  world	  is	  even	  if	  there	  is	  no	  truth	  about	  
the	  way	  the	  world	  ought	  to	  be.	  
23	  A	  milder	  version	  of	  this	  objection	  would	  see	  the	  task	  of	  political	  philosophy	  as	  mapping	  
conceptual	  space,	  not	  seeking	  the	  truth.	  But	  this	  fails	  to	  remove	  the	  problem	  of	  political	  bias.	  
Our	  biases	  affect	  not	  only	  our	  ability	  to	  judge	  the	  veracity	  of	  propositions,	  but	  also	  our	  
understanding	  of	  the	  terms	  and	  concepts	  involved.	  We	  frame	  ideas	  that	  conform	  to	  our	  
political	  leanings	  in	  ways	  that	  make	  them	  sound	  better	  and	  cohere	  with	  other	  plausible	  beliefs,	  
and	  vice	  versa.	  Political	  activism	  also	  impairs	  our	  ability	  to	  correctly	  map	  conceptual	  space.	  
24	  Trivially,	  of	  course,	  first-­‐hand	  experience	  might	  be	  necessary	  for	  knowing	  “what	  it’s	  like”	  from	  
the	  inside,	  so	  to	  speak,	  to	  be	  a	  slave.	  But	  that	  kind	  of	  knowledge	  is	  not	  necessary	  for	  
understanding	  what	  makes	  slavery	  wrong.	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25	  Note	  that,	  even	  if	  I	  am	  wrong	  about	  this,	  and	  seeking	  the	  truth	  about	  politics	  requires	  
personal	  activism,	  that	  still	  does	  not	  license	  unbridled	  activism.	  The	  problem	  of	  bias	  still	  exists.	  
We	  need,	  then,	  to	  balance	  the	  drawbacks	  and	  alleged	  benefits	  of	  activism.	  Most	  likely	  this	  
would	  mean	  that	  activism	  is	  permissible	  for	  only	  those	  who	  work	  on	  topics	  for	  which	  activism	  is	  
particularly	  likely	  to	  yield	  insight.	  
26	  In	  fairness,	  a	  number	  of	  psychologists	  have	  started	  taking	  these	  and	  related	  concerns	  
seriously.	  See	  e.g.	  Tetlock	  (1994),	  Mullen	  et	  al.	  (2003).	  See	  also	  Jonathan	  Haidt’s	  writings	  on	  the	  
topic,	  available	  online	  at	  http://people.stern.nyu.edu/jhaidt/postpartisan.html	  (accessed	  at	  
6/21/2014).	  	  To	  my	  knowledge,	  however,	  philosophers,	  political	  scientists,	  and	  really	  anyone	  
else,	  have	  so	  far	  either	  ignored	  or	  actively	  denied	  my	  conclusion.	  
